講座題目五：Bargaining their way to success: Machiavellian CEOs, organizational costs, and firm performance
講 座 人：Aaron Hill
講座人簡介：
Dr. Aaron Hill is the Assistant Professor of Management at the Warrington College of Business at the University of Florida. His research interests include executives and top management teams, strategic leadership, and corporate political activity. Dr. Hill’s research has been published in top-tier journals including Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Journal, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Journal of Management. He currently serves as an editorial board member for Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management, and Strategic Organization. He received Academy of Management Journal Best Reviewer Award (2017) and Richard W. Poole Research Excellence Award from Oklahoma State University (2012-2017).
講座英文摘要：
This study builds on insights from both upper echelons and economizing theories in strategic management to examine the effects of CEO Machiavellianism on firm performance. While Machiavellianism has been usually construed as a purely negative trait, we argue that the pragmatic focus on the outcomes of exchanges and psychological obsession with winning in transactions that Machiavellian CEOs bring to their organizations can have important effects on organizational costs and performance. In line with our arguments, we find that CEO Machiavellianism has negative effects on relevant organizational costs and positive effects on organizational performance. We find support for our ideas with a sample of S&P 500 CEOs, operationalizing CEO Machiavellianism with a videometric approach. Supplemental analyses suggest that Machiavellian CEOs may bargain their way to personal success too, captured via upward pay adjustments, pay above predicted levels, and larger “Golden Parachutes” in the event of termination.
講座中文摘要：
本研究基于戰(zhàn)略管理中的高階理論和節(jié)約理論，研究CEO馬基雅維利主義（又稱權(quán)謀主義）對企業(yè)績效的影響。雖然馬基雅維利主義通常被認(rèn)為是一種純粹的消極特征，但我們認(rèn)為馬基雅維利CEO對于交易結(jié)果的實用主義關(guān)注以及其對在交易中獲勝的心理迷戀會對組織成本和績效產(chǎn)生重要影響。我們采用了500家企業(yè)CEO的樣本來驗證我們的假設(shè)，并通過攝像的方法測量CEO馬基雅維利主義。與假設(shè)一致，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)CEO馬基雅維利主義與組織成本成負(fù)相關(guān)，而與組織績效成正相關(guān)。進(jìn)一步的分析結(jié)果表明，馬基雅維利CEO也可以通過討價還價實現(xiàn)個人成功，包括上調(diào)薪酬和在任期終止時撐大“黃金降落傘”。
講座題目六：Getting by with a little help from my friends: does political affinity lead to lower M&A premiums?
講座人：Alex Settles
講座人簡介：
Dr. Alex Settles is the Clinical Associate Professor of Management at the Warrington College of Business at the University of Florida. His research interests include international business and entrepreneurship. His research has been published in scholarly journals including Strategic Management Journal, International Journal for Human Resource Management, Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal, and International Studies of Management and Organization. He is the recipient of CIEBS Best Paper Award from the International Management Division of Academy of Management (2014) and Faculty of Professional Practice Research Excellence Award from Rutgers Business School (2016).
講座英文摘要：
The rise of economic nationalism and media reports suggest that politics plays an important role in international business transactions. However, we still know very little about how bilateral political relations affect corporate decision-making. In this article, we analyze the influence of the quality of bilateral political relations on the bidding behavior of foreign acquirers in cross-border acquisitions. We argue that the host government is more likely to intervene against the foreign acquirer during deal negotiations if the quality of bilateral political relations is poor. In the context of economic nationalism, we investigate the relevance of political affinity between countries to the initial acquisition premium offered in cross-border acquisitions. Political affinity is defined as the similarity of national interests in global affairs. We argue that political affinity affects how foreign acquirers anticipate their bargaining position in their negotiations with domestic target firms. With decreasing political affinity, the host government becomes increasingly likely to intervene against foreign firms in an acquisition deal. Consequently, foreign acquirers need to provide a more lucrative initial offer to dissuade target firms from leveraging government intervention to oppose the acquisition. Our prediction is supported by strong evidence that political affinity, as revealed by UN general assembly voting patterns, leads to lower initial acquisition premiums. A lower political affinity between countries therefore decreases the bargaining power of the acquirer and pushes up the initial bid premium the acquirer has to offer to the local target. Our empirical results confirm our argument.
講座中文摘要：
經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義的興起和與日俱增的媒體報道表明，政治在國際商業(yè)交易中發(fā)揮著重要作用。但是，我們對雙邊政治關(guān)系如何影響公司決策仍然知之甚少。本研究分析了雙邊政治關(guān)系質(zhì)量對外國收購者在跨境收購中競標(biāo)行為的影響。本研究認(rèn)為，如果雙邊政治關(guān)系質(zhì)量差，東道國政府更有可能在交易談判中對外國收購者進(jìn)行干預(yù)。在經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義的背景下，我們實證研究了各國之間政治親和力與跨境收購中提供的初始收購溢價的相關(guān)性。政治親和力被定義為在全球事務(wù)中國家利益的相似性。本研究認(rèn)為，政治親和力會影響外國收購者如何在與國內(nèi)目標(biāo)公司的談判中預(yù)估其談判地位。隨著政治親和力的降低，東道國政府越來越有可能在收購交易中對外國公司進(jìn)行干預(yù)。因此，外國收購者需要提供更有利可圖的初始報價，以阻止目標(biāo)公司利用政府干預(yù)來反對收購。我們的預(yù)測得到強有力的證據(jù)支持，政治親和力的確導(dǎo)致初始收購溢價降低。繼而，各國之間較低的政治親和力降低了收購方的議價能力，并提高了收購方必須向當(dāng)?shù)啬繕?biāo)公司提供的初始投標(biāo)溢價。本研究的實證結(jié)果證實了我們的觀點。
講座題目七：Starting in pole position: Applicant initial preferences and ultimate job choices
講座人：Brian Swider
講座人簡介：
Dr. Brian Swider is the Assistant Professor of Management at the Warrington College of Business at the University of Florida. His research interests include selection, withdrawal, recruitment, well-being, and meta-analysis. He has published his research in scholarly journals including Journal of Applied Psychology, Human Resource Management, Journal of Management, The Leadership Quarterly, Journal of Vocational Behavior, and Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology. He is the recipient of the Brady Family Award for Faculty Research Excellence from Georgia Institute of Technology (2017). He currently serves as an associate editor for Human Resource Management and an editorial board member for Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology.
講座英文摘要：
While much is known about the various factors that predict future applicant attitudes and decisions during the recruitment process, far less is known about how these attitudes develop over time. In a field sample (Study 1), applicant initial preferences among a set of four firms predicted the directionality of subsequent applicant organizational attraction towards the firms over the five month recruiting cycle. Further, these initial preferences significantly predicted job choice decisions even after accounting for changes in organizational attraction that occurred during the entire recruiting cycle. Findings in a laboratory sample (Study 2) were consistent with research on predecision information distortion (PID) as applicants’ increasingly consistent attitude updating process was shown to be driven, in part, by inaccurate information processing. Applicants were overly positive (negative) regarding information about their eventually chosen (rejected) alternative. Applicants arriving at job choice decisions using biased information processing have the potential to result in adverse consequences for both organizations and applicants themselves.
講座中文摘要：
雖然已有大量研究探索在招聘過程中求職者態(tài)度和決策的各種預(yù)測因素，但我們對于這些態(tài)度如何隨著時間的推移而變化卻知之甚少。通過實地調(diào)研（研究1），我們發(fā)現(xiàn)五個月的招聘周期中，求職者在四家企業(yè)中的初始偏好預(yù)測了其后續(xù)評價的組織吸引力。此外，即使在考慮了整個招聘周期中出現(xiàn)的組織吸引力變化之后，這些初始偏好也顯著地預(yù)測了工作選擇決策。實驗樣本（研究2）的研究結(jié)果與預(yù)定信息失真（PID）的研究一致，這是由于申請人越來越一致的態(tài)度更新過程在一定程度上是由于失準(zhǔn)的信息加工所驅(qū)動的。求職者對于他們最終選擇（拒絕）的替代方案信息過于積極（消極）。使用有偏差的信息加工做出工作抉擇的求職者有可能對企業(yè)和求職者本身造成不利后果。
主持人：張寶山 教授
講座時間：14：30
講座日期：2019-5-8
地 點：雁塔校區(qū)教學(xué)九樓9209學(xué)術(shù)報告廳
主辦單位：心理學(xué)院
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